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CVE-2024-47740

Medium

Elevated severity or exploit probability.

CVSS base
7.1 HIGH
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
EPSS — probability of exploitation (30 days)
0.2%
14.6th percentile
CISA KEV
Not listed
Weakness / dates
Published 2024-10-21 · modified 2026-08-04

CVSS breakdown

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H

Attack VectorLLocal
Attack ComplexityLLow
Privileges RequiredLLow
User InteractionNNone
ScopeUUnchanged
ConfidentialityNNone
IntegrityHHigh
AvailabilityHHigh

Timeline

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: f2fs: Require FMODE_WRITE for atomic write ioctls The F2FS ioctls for starting and committing atomic writes check for inode_owner_or_capable(), but this does not give LSMs like SELinux or Landlock an opportunity to deny the write access - if the caller's FSUID matches the inode's UID, inode_owner_or_capable() immediately returns true. There are scenarios where LSMs want to deny a process the ability to write particular files, even files that the FSUID of the process owns; but this can currently partially be bypassed using atomic write ioctls in two ways: - F2FS_IOC_START_ATOMIC_REPLACE + F2FS_IOC_COMMIT_ATOMIC_WRITE can truncate an inode to size 0 - F2FS_IOC_START_ATOMIC_WRITE + F2FS_IOC_ABORT_ATOMIC_WRITE can revert changes another process concurrently made to a file Fix it by requiring FMODE_WRITE for these operations, just like for F2FS_IOC_MOVE_RANGE. Since any legitimate caller should only be using these ioctls when intending to write into the file, that seems unlikely to break anything.

Affected

linux

References

Official: NVD · CVE.org